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Abstract. The broader meaning of hermeneutics is presented, a meaning that cannot be reduced to the 
method of scientific research. It is assumed that the basis of hermeneutical rationality is the human way of 
life, which is characterized not by total self-control, but by a clear interweaving of unconscious and 
conscious processes. In this context, the thesis that the hermeneutical procedure is inextricably linked 
with social life, verbal communication, and the cognitive-emotional-volitional receptivity of others is 
explained. In addition, it is proved that the hermeneutical power of language is the basis of every stable 
and functional community, and long-term psychosocial integration and coexistence cannot be achieved by 
the opposite means, that is, through violence. 
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Аннотация. Изложен более широкий смысл герменевтики, тот смысл, который не может быть 
сведен к методу научного исследования. Предполагается, что в основе герменевтической 
рациональности лежит человеческий образ жизни, который характеризуется не тотальным 
самоконтролем, а понятным переплетением бессознательных и сознательных процессов. В этом 
контексте объяснен тезис о том, что герменевтическая процедура неразрывно связана с 
общественной жизнью, вербальной коммуникацией и когнитивно-эмоциональноволевой 
восприимчивостью других. Кроме того, доказано, что герменевтическая сила языка представляет 
собой основу каждой устойчивой и функциональной общины и долгосрочная психосоциальная 
интеграция и сосуществование не могут быть обеспечены противоположными средствами, то есть 
посредством насилия.  
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In this paper, I will postulate that hermeneutic rationality, as its essential characteristic, 
includes community life, communicative interaction and relations with other persons. Such a 
thesis can also be supported by the fact that Dilthey and Gadamer, as significant philosophy 
founders of hermeneutic method, emphasized intersubjective and dialogical sense of the interpre-
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tation process and understanding historical events and spiritual creations. In their understanding, 
comprehension comprises the communication of sense, in finding one’s own I in some Thou, 
that is, in the clarification of the given historical and cultural heritage as concrete answers to the 
questions which the interpreters and authors of that which is interpreted have in common. The 
point is that hermeneutic research does not represent the application of the method by some neu-
tral research subject to some non-subject object of research, but it is about the relationship be-
tween one subject and the other subject, about their co-participation, i.e. about the encompass-
ment of explorers and the explored by a common theme of that which is examined. Accordingly, 
in the first part of my consideration, I will strive to explain in what sense a joint undertaking or 
togetherness makes the essential characteristic of hermeneutic rationality.   
Among other things, the consideration of the joint character of hermeneutics will include 
both proving that the rationality of hermeneutic experience arises from interaction with others, 
and indicating that within hermeneutic way of thinking, a person’s freedom is based on unforced 
communication between I and Thou. In the first case, it is about the fact that other people are our 
mirror and that precisely that feedback we receive from them, by living together, enables adjust-
ing our arbitrary personal beliefs and attitudes, that is, it provides the possibility for a better or 
more reliable understanding of one’s own and someone else’s individual and collective acts. In 
the second case, it is about the fact that freedom cannot be reduced to individual conquest, some-
thing we can and have to obtain by ourselves, but that free personality status also includes its ap-
preciation by communicative partners, some kind of benevolence and generosity on their part. It 
is precisely the hermeneutic approach in anthropological and sociological thinking that implies 
giving the other people, the persons whose activities or creations we interpret, the right to mani-
fest their freedom and to be something more than mere objects of research, which means that 
spirit of togetherness, which is specific to hermeneutic rationality, affirms emancipation in a 
non-individualistic manner.   
On the basis of the previous analyses, in the second part of my consideration, I will en-
deavor to shed light on the essence of community, what makes a community a community. I will 
postulate that the relationship between community and hermeneutics is essential in both direc-
tions, that is, for both conceptual correlations: it is not only about hermeneutics having a charac-
teristic of togetherness, but also that hermeneutic communication of sense is fundamental to the 
community. Bearing in mind a possible counterargument that community life contains not only 
hermeneutic benevolence, understanding and agreements, but also conflicts and misunderstand-
ings, I will pay special attention to the explanation of ambivalent aspects of hermeneutic experi-
ence, demonstrating that its essence is not in nonconflicting acceptance of that which is close and 
understandable to us, but in resolving conflicts, in approaching that which seems strange and ir-
rational to us. In this way, I will strive to prove that hermeneutic character of community is re-
flected in the skill of living together, which includes the power to turn the absurdity of social life 
into a communicative sense. Finally, in the conclusion of the paper, I will draw the most im-
portant conclusions which arise from the conducted interpretations and analyses.  
2. A shared character of hermeneutics 
If bearing in mind that hermeneutics is the skill of understanding and interpreting, and that 
every understanding is carried out in some natural language, the language which is spoken and 
lived in, then it could be said that hermeneutic experience is always intersubjective activity, that it 
is based on the exchange within a certain community of subjects (persons). In that sense, herme-
neutic procedure is always a matter of joint undertaking, even when it unfolds in a complete social 
isolation and the deepest solitude, since language is what connects us communicatively or mentally 
with others. Accordingly, Wittgenstein and many other great philosophers thought that a private 
language was not possible. The point is that linguistic contents that we cannot make comprehensi-
ble to others are not comprehensible to ourselves, and vice versa, that signifying material which we 
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understand in our own privacy can, in principle, be understood by other people. Admittedly, Witt-
genstein was very inspired by Kierkegaard’s thinking, which contain a sharp criticism of collectiv-
ist generalization and social levelling of personal experiences. However, neither did Kierkegaard 
deny the significance of community, but he accentuated the primacy of man’s interaction with 
God, in regard to the communication within a group, which means only that the Danish thinker 
superimposed this kind of togetherness on collective communication, not calling into question the 
importance of togetherness as such.    
In my understanding, a community and communication with the people we are closest to 
is similar to the community and communication with God, because in both cases, it is about fac-
ing linguistic boundaries, something that seems mysterious and inexpressible, but also about lin-
guistic articulation and expressing such experiences. This means that inexpressible is in a certain 
sense also expressible, because not only can it be shared when meeting face-to-face, but its trans-
lation from the sphere of private experiences into the domain of communicable signifying some-
thing as vague or irrational is also possible. Although the origin of the language itself is very 
mysterious, because it concerns precisely the relationship between the human and the divine, it 
does not, however, reduce the possibility of revealing and announcing that which was hidden and 
secret through linguistic expressions. Accordingly, it can be said that also those types of herme-
neutic experience which could be thought to refute the claim about understanding as a joint or 
public undertaking, actually confirm that togetherness is at the base of every language and every 
hermeneutics. A language has different levels, various profound and surface layers, but all of 
them equally attest to the crucial significance of interaction in a community, for any understand-
ing process or methodical interpretation. In this context, Kierkegaard’s criticism of the superfici-
ality of collective communication should be understood as advocating for closer and deeper 
communication, and not as giving up on community.  
It follows from the aforesaid that it is advisable to distinguish between two basic mean-
ings of togetherness: a community in micro and macro formats, that is, (1) the connection that 
exists between close persons, between I and Thou, and (2) the connection that exists between the 
members of wider groups and societies. Both types of togetherness are important for the herme-
neutical procedure, that is, either type of interaction, which is why the absence of some concrete 
and obvious form of togetherness in the process of interpretation cannot be an argument against 
the thesis about the shared character of hermeneutics. As one of the founders of the methodology 
of spiritual-historical sciences, Dilthey emphasized the significance of autobiographical 
knowledge for interpreting collective historic events and objectified spiritual acts. This signifi-
cance implies that correct understanding of one’s own individual life, and the individual life en-
tails the interaction with important and close other persons, is a condition for a successful inter-
pretation of social movements. In Dilthey’s words, “all the interpretation of written work is only 
skillful construction of understanding process which spans an entire lifetime and which concerns 
every type of speech and writing. Therefore, the analysis of understanding presents the founda-
tion for establishing the interpretation rules” [my translation]  [Diltaj, 1980: 107]. Human under-
standing “spans an entire lifetime”, because immanent search for interactive and reflexive lin-
guistic sense of that which is occurring is present in every human experience. Therefore, it can 
be said that, in this sense, a community on the micro-plane has a basic role in the interpretation 
of global processes in a human society. 
Similarly to Kierkegaard, Dilthey could also be thought to have individualized hermeneu-
tic methodology of spiritual and social sciences by his potentiation of the significance of self-
awareness, understanding his own personal experience. However, as in the previous case, with 
this philosopher also, things are not as they seem at first sight. By distinguishing between the 
explanation process, which is characteristic of natural sciences, and the understanding process, 
Dilthey points out that: “explanation occurs via exclusively intellectual processes, but we under-
stand by all mental abilities co-participating in the understanding process. In understanding, we 
start from the context of a whole, which is given to us as live so that we understand the individu-
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al from it” [my translation]  [ibid: 69]. The point is that one’s own life experience is not some-
thing fragmentary or individual, because it actually has a holistic character and is in many as-
pects more comprehensive than individual subjects of natural sciences. Human personality is a 
microcosm, and as such it cannot be more comprehensive than the cosmos, but it is a wider unity 
than natural sciences, than sience of the cosmos, because they are based solely on cognitive acts, 
while a person’s life includes both emotional and volitional processes. Moreover, a human per-
sonality can be said to be the god’s icon, which certainly elevates it above all the forms of the 
created nature, and makes its life more complex and richer than other types of natural processes. 
In this context, Dilthey’s insistence on methodological significance of personal experience and 
autobiographical reflection does not imply individualization, but totalization. 
Unlike reductivist and detotalizing cognitive processes inherent in natural sciences, within 
which a one-dimensional relation between a cognitive subject and a cognitive object is affirmed, it 
is precisely emotional and volitional acts that imply multidimensional intersubjective communica-
tion and the wholeness of living together. It means that a complete coactivity of all mental abilities, 
which Dilthey ascribed to understanding and hermeneutic process, is not only intrapsychic, but al-
so interpsychic property of the individual who is interpreting, because it always includes interper-
sonal exchange of psychical experiences. The point is that emotions and will, as complements of 
cognitive acts which enable proper individual understanding of social-historical processes, are con-
stituted through a community with God and close persons, since emotional and volitional processes 
concern our receptivity to God, as eminent Other, and meeting or failing to meet the expectations 
of other people. In this sense, Scheler, one of Dilthey’s distinguished disciples, indicated that emo-
tional and volitional attitudes of human person are not something arbitrary and chaotic, but that 
they represent “the microcosm of the world of values“ [my translation]  [Šeler, 2011: 103]. There-
by, the author of the book The Human’s Place in the Cosmos especially emphasized love as the 
prime emotion, explaining that through it, that order of values which is not a matter of human crea-
tion, but conforming with the hierarchy of goods established by God as the creator of the world, is 
revealed and crystalized.   
In other words, hermeneutic rationality has the property of extended rationality, insofar 
as, in addition to intellectual, it comprises both emotional and volitional processes, which are of 
vital importance to the cognition of the wider unity or the so-called life-world, as well as for the 
coordination with co-participants in life events, that is, for strengthening the order of values on 
which a community rests. Since a man is a social being, his feelings are always colored by his 
relationships with his loved ones, and desires and goals of a human individual are mediated by 
the interests and preoccupations of other people. The idea of extended rationality, in the form of 
community’s insight into mental processes of an individual, is also reflected in hermeneutic po-
tentiation of the inevitable role of pre-judgements in every interpretation process, which Gada-
mer expecially insisted on. According to his teachings, pre-judgements cannot be reduced to per-
sonal idiosyncrasies, to man’s misjudgements and arbitrary judgments, because at the base of 
pre-understanding, there is sociability, intersubjective reality of a human being, without which 
the understanding process of any text or historical event cannot be started or performed. This 
philosopher points out that hermeneutics implies “mediating between then and now, between the 
‘Thou’ and the ‘I’ [Gadamer, 2006: 329], as well as that “the hermeneutic phenomenon too im-
plies the primacy of dialogue and the structure of question and answer”  [ibid: 363]. The point is 
that understanding and interpreting cannot be successful if interpreters regard the events and 
texts they interpret as some neutral objects of study, as the topics that do not concern them per-
sonally. On the contrary, interpretative progress can be made only when an active relationship is 
established with the interpreted contents, when one experiences the involvement of one’s own 
subjectivity in the context of research, i.e. when one feels personally involved in shared tasks, 
questions and answers that are being considered. 
As I pointed out in one of the previous studies “hermeneutic skill concerns understanding 
spoken or natural language, which in its precision cannot be compared to the formal language of 
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natural-mathematical sciences, but this shortcoming of its is compensated by mediated forms of 
communication, through appropriate forms of social life“ [my translation]  [Govedarica, 2013: 
73]. Habermas’s teaching about the indivisibility of hermeneutics from everyday interaction is 
considered in this study, according to which “ordinary language does not obey the syntax of a 
pure language. It becomes complete only when enmeshed with interactions and corporeal forms 
of expression.”  [Habermas, 1972: 168]. It is about the fact that the imperfection of everyday 
speech, fragmentarity and susceptibility to chance, do not diminish its truthfulness and rationali-
ty, but they provide it differently, i.e. by other means relative to natural-scientific adequate cor-
responding of the statement with the state of things in the outside world. Ultimately, the truthful-
ness of theories in the domain of hermeneutic sciences does not concern their accuracy regarding 
overlapping with objective reality, the reality of the outside objects, but their intersubjective va-
lidity, correspondence with intersubjective reality. It is precisely in that sense that the validity of 
hermeneutic knowledge is inseparable from valid communication in spoken language, which in-
cludes accepting and sharing the same values, as well as emotional exchange, that is, “reading” 
bodily expressions of emotional states of partners in a communication.   
Altough the essence of hermeneutic rationality does not consist of conformity, it can be 
said to possess the characteristic of intersubjective harmonization, i.e. the harmonization be-
tween I and Thou. On one hand, it is about the fact that diversity aнd tolerance of a different 
opinion are much more present in it than in mathematical or natural-scientific forms of cognition, 
which are not characterized by dialogical divergence, but monological convergence, that is, 
searching for logically necessary consequences or for true causal-consequential relationships. On 
the other hand, it is about the fact that relativist approval of arbitrariness, monadic autism or the 
right to individual idiosyncracies are not characteristic of hermeneutic rationality, but shared ex-
amination of realism in the form of mutual understanding of any subjective experience. Herme-
neutic cognition equally concerns understanding others and understanding yourself, because it is 
based on what Habermas calls communicative action, which includes mutual knowing, recogniz-
ing and acknowledging other’s and one’s own experiences. The point is that man’s self-
understanding is mediated by the understanding of others, more precisely, how a concrete person 
is understood by other people and how he understands other persons. The incapability of under-
standing by others, the absence of communication with them, is also always followed by the lack 
of self-understanding, misunderstanding with yourself, the same as the interpretative recognition 
of own supressed experiences, in the interpreted contents of someone else’s experience, is a 
strong impulse for their self-consciousness and acceptance as a part of one’s own personality.  
In other words, honest self-reflection and rational consideration of one’s own life is 
achieved only through reflection in the form of receiving feedback information from other peo-
ple, by reflecting in their eyes and linguistic reactions, because only through them it is possible 
to correct wrong and reinforce justified beliefs about yourself. The rationality of self-reflection 
consists of coactivity of all mental processes, of inner coherence and achieving harmony with 
yourself, but since emotional and volitional acts interfere with what other persons experience and 
do, the inner harmony cannot be achieved without harmonic interpersonal communication and 
proper social coordination. Perfecting hermeneutic competencies is in the function of improving 
communication and coordination with others, and thereby with oneself. Rationality of rich her-
meneutic experience consists of precisely enabling deeper understanding of other’s experiences, 
which also results in better communication with one’s own person. Therefore, rationality of her-
meneutics is communicative rationality, which comprises the capacity for unforced resolution of 
inner and outer conflicts. 
When we interpret other’s experiences and actions, then we engage in an equal dialogue 
with their participants, in the sense that we, in our thoughts or in direct communication with 
them, acknowledge that they adopted a rational position in the given events and that they knew 
what they were doing, the same as they to us, tacitly or explicitly, trust that we can understand 
them in a competent manner. In this context, understanding always includes mutual acceptance 
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and approval, which is obvious in an active dialogue, but it is implicitly present in what we can 
call a hermeneutic dialogue between an interpreter and the interpreted. If we bear in mind the 
cases of successful active dialogue, then we possess the reasons to assert that mutual understand-
ing implies calling upon the freedom of the other, that is, mutual liberating and encouraging one 
to be a person, i.e. to rise above the objective state of things. Thereby, the effect of such libera-
tion is much greater than a panful struggle to gain one’s freedom, through unilateral imposition 
of one’s own individual attitude, which implies that, besides rational life, unforced emancipation 
is also a matter of dialogical action and hermeneutic togetherness.  
3. Hermeneutic character of community 
To the extent that a community is not a mere sum of its members, accidental, anonymous 
and replacable, it is justified to say that hermeneutics, as mutual understanding, is at the core of 
togetherness. Actually, when the community becomes only a mere collection of individuals it 
comprises, although they do not know nor understand each other, then the togetherness is in cri-
sis, and is close to dissolution. On the other hand, what makes a community vital and authentic 
is intensive communication and coordinated cooperation between its members, which compris-
es hermeneutic capacity of familiarizing with the experiences of strangers, with something 
previously experienced as someone else’s. Thereby, essential or authentic togetherness implies 
the commitment to the same values, co-participation in their realization, but also the irreplace-
able role of every person in this process, that is, mutual awareness and interdependence of 
people in contributing to the fulfilment of mutual tasks. In that sense, a community is in its es-
sence characterized by both generality, and particularity and personalization, because, on one 
side, it is characterized by openness to something that exceeds concrete human individuals in-
dividually, while, on the other hand, it is precisely characterized by personal concretizations of 
participating in general or universal values, i.e. particular participation in great causes which 
congregate its members.  
It is important to point out that the highest values, on which human communities rest, are 
not something self-understandable, so in relation to them too, a hermeneutic approach is neces-
sary. Awareness of this need is thereby greater if bearing in mind that such values are not human 
creations, but that they have supra-anthropological character. The point is that the values created 
by man, such as various material goods or culture industry products, do not take the highest posi-
tions on the axiological scales, because they are reserved for spiritual and sacred values, the val-
ues that human beings can serve and in which they can participate, but which they cannot create, 
neither individually, nor collectively, because their origin is divine. The aforementioned Schel-
er’s thought about the order of values as a God-given hierarchy of the worthiness of love, implies 
that humans cannot succeed in their endeavours to invert the divine order, to create higher values 
out of the lower ones in a sustainable manner, indicating that the most rational thing is to fit into 
a God-given axiological hierarchy, that is, submit and serve the unchanged value relations. Such 
a state of things imposes the idea that neither is the authentic human community a human crea-
tion, since at the base of human togetherness, there is the providing for the values which exceed 
the domain of man’s free and creative choices. Certainly, there are also non-authentic human 
communities, such as totalitarian regimes, where social life is established to serve autocratic 
government instead of serving divine values. However, such communities cannot last long, pre-
cisely because they are non-authentic and destructive, so their temporary existence cannot be an 
argument against the thesis that a true and sustainable togetherness does not have anthropologi-
cal, but theological foundations.  
It is certainly no coincidence that the whole hermeneutics originated from theological 
hermeneutics, from the interpretation of God’s words and acts. However, the term for this disci-
pline has in its root the name of Hermes, a deity from Greek mythology, who was a herald and a 
mediator between the other gods and humans according to the legend, and who possessed the 
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ability to make previously incomprehensible god’s will comprehensible to man. Since essential 
togetherness rests on the commitment to the God-given order of values, it can be said that it is 
precisely theological hermeneutics that is crucial for understanding the spirit of togetherness. 
Thereby, it should be borne in mind that theological hermeneutics attests to the possibility of ra-
tional confrontation with the greatest (God’s) secrets, that is, the interpretative capability for 
their conception, in such a way that they, instead of being paralysing impediments, become a 
driving force for spiritual and the entire development of life, of both individual humans, and eve-
ry concrete human community. In that sense, it can be said that every form of public life has 
some deep secret at its roots, which means that what is public and what is secret do not exclude 
each other, but they complement and empower each other, and all thanks to the transformation of 
Hermes’ ability into human hermeneutic capacities. In any case, hermeneutic roots of a commu-
nity imply the internal ambivalences of human experience, but also the capability of dealing suc-
cessfully with them, and the significance of such dynamics is the reason why further in the con-
siderations, I will focus on examining those characteristics of hermeneutics, which are at the 
same time the characteristics of sustainable life together.   
As was already pointed out, hermeneutics implies overcoming the contrasts between ra-
tionality and irrationality, that is, the extended rationality with the contents which previously 
seemed completely dissonant and incompatible with it. If in addition to theological exegesis, we 
also bear in mind psychoanalytic hermeneutics, then it can be asserted that the essence of inter-
pretative progress in understanding consists of turning the unconscious into the conscious, and 
that which is mysterious and dark into clear and bright, i.e. finding sense in what appears to be 
senseless. In psychoanalytical understanding, man’s psychophysical health, his optimal function-
ing in private life, professional activities and broader social relations depends crucially on such 
expansion of consciousness, so Freud’s followers paid special attention to the interpretation of 
dreams and other mysterious expressions of human enigmatic or unconscious experiences. Thus, 
Lacan emphasizes the significance of interpretative translation of a non-transparent and sympto-
matic language, the language composed of indirect signs, which can be less or more successful in 
discreet broadcast of important, personal messages, pointing out that such signifying material, to 
the extent in which it is successful, also contains within itself creative potential of metaphoricity, 
since “metaphor is situated at the precise point at which meaning is produced in nonmeaning” 
[Lacan, 2006: 423]. In my understanding, the point is that both metaphors and psychoneurotic 
symptoms require interpretation, except in the first case, there is immanent author’s auto-
interpretation of metaphorical expressions, which also considerably facilitates its comprehension 
in large-scale communication, while the incapability of self-understanding and the necessity of 
outside interpretation are characteristic of the cases of the mentioned symptomatic creations, i.e. 
expert interpretation by other subjects. Their shared point concerns the fact that senselessness 
cannot be turned into sense without successfully performed hermeneutic process, on yourself 
and/or on somebody else.   
The logic of internal, intrapsychic, conflicts and their overcoming is very similar, if not 
identical, to the logic of the external, social conflicts and their successful resolution, because in 
both cases, the language has the first and the final word, that is, linguistic processing of the given 
experience in the form of its communication, excommunication and re-communication. The 
point is that psychical and social irrationality equally have the form of unintelligible non-
integratedness and disconnectedness, i.e. separation and insubordination of one segment in rela-
tion to the other parts and the wider unity which the rogue instance belongs to, which causes un-
conscious or conscious tension and conflicts between the majority and the minority side of the 
psychosocial system. By contrast, acquiring rationality in both cases includes understandable in-
tegration and the reconciliation of antagonistic forces, that is, providing a functional coordination 
and coexistence between adequate subsystems within the main system. Nevertheless, hermeneu-
tic (non power of language has a crucial role, both in conflct-emergence phase, and in the pro-
cess of its escalation or its successful resolution, whether it is about the occurrences in person’s 
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inner life, or it is about the occurrences in human relationships within a community. In my opinion, 
such linguistic state of things, the fact that (dis) functional language has equally relevant psychical 
and social role, attests to subjectivity being inseparable from intersubjectivity, in the sense that in-
tersubjectivity is, at least implicitly, characteristic of every linguistic autointerpretative expression 
of experiences, as well as every external interpretation of it, hermeneutic-linguistic understanding, 
regardless of the extent of the privacy in which these processes take place.  
Language manifests its power or functionality when understanding, communication and 
overcoming misunderstandings is achieved through linguistic acts, and its non-power or dysfunc-
tionality is present in the opposite cases. For example, metaphorical expressions are linguistic 
acts that enable life-saving integration and comprehensible reconciliation of previously dishar-
monic or chaotic elements of their creators’ own experience, while symptomatic language crea-
tions are the places where the non-power of such self-integration and self-understanding mani-
fests in their emittents. In a certain sense, it can be said that metaphors are successful symptoms, 
i.e. the symptoms of internal conflict, which is spontaneously overcome, and also that symptoms 
are unsuccessful metaphors, that is, attempts of inner reconciliation, which are not fruitful. Alt-
hough these examples concern psychical processes and the domains of personal experiences, the 
linguistic dynamics in a social sphere has the identical properties, that dynamics on which a har-
monious or non-harmonious life in a community rests, in any part of it. Just as the inner life of any 
human person is not always harmonious and conflict-free, but thanks to successful language acts, it 
can always achieve life-saving integration, neither can social life take place without tension and 
conflict, but fruitful linguistic breakthroughs in overcoming irrational conflicts can also be 
achieved in the community, in the form of creative social metaphors, and in the direction of 
achieving a new understanding harmony. Similarly to the cases of psychological disharmony, 
which cannot be overcome by auto-interpretative language acts, and the local blocks in social 
communication, where the symptoms of social pathology are manifested, it has to be intervened 
from the outside, but it is important that heremenutic power of language has the final say in that 
intervention, and not the forceful means of physical coercion, because it is the only way to achieve 
a long-lasting reconciliation of conflicting sides.   
In accordance with the previously stated, advocating the thesis that every authentic, har-
monious and sustainable community rests on hermeneutic power of communication does not im-
ply any naivety, any unfounded belief that one can live in any community conflict-free, and in 
the manner of direct agreement or uninterrupted tolerant understanding. Oscillations in a social 
life are inevitable, so hermeneutic understanding in this context, like in individual-psychological 
domain, cannot be some static attitude of a distant, calm and undisturbed human mind, but it has 
to have the characteristics of dynamic and ambivalent process of mutual compliance, which in-
cludes occasional acute crises and strong turbulences, that is, the episodes of misunderstanding, 
strife and intolerance. The analogy with psychological conflicts attests to the fact that the con-
flicts in a community can also be successfully overcome, ultimately, only through linguistic acts 
as the most important means of the hermeneutic process, at times spontaneously and without ex-
ternal meditation, and sometimes with the inevitable outside interference and adequate expert 
mediation. However, in both cases, intersubjective confrontation with a kind of distress and the 
experience of pain is inevitable, that is, with the irrational and/or pathological behaviour, and the 
difference between milder and more severe forms of social disintegration concerns the degree of 
acuteness of life troubles and the extent of (auto) destructiveness. In accordance with this degree 
and extent, the hermeneutic language capacity for social re-integration is more or less manifest-
ed, whereby that measure and concrete linguistic effects overcome human will, i.e. crucially de-
pend on mysterious God’s will and on human submitting to the God-given order of values.   
Despite the fact that it was pointed here to the internal ambivalences of the process of un-
derstanding and language articulation, someone might feel that hermeneutic rationality is some-
thing too moderate and neutral to be justifiable to assert that a community rests on it precisely. In 
Bataille’s understanding, the downside of rationality consists of the tendency toward conserva-
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tism and self-sufficiency characteristic of it, in the fact that a rational man rejects the “desire to 
exceed limits – limits that don’t simply mark off the individual’s margins, but those of reason 
itself” [my translation] [Bataj, 1988: 152]. Accordingly, in his interpretation of such ideas, Ha-
bermas, a big supporter of hermeneutic rationality and consensuality, pointed out that the su-
preme value in this French author is “conceived of as the other of reason” [Habermas, 1998: 
229]. Bataille’s thinking is so much more challenging relative to the thesis advocated in this pa-
per, if it is borne in mind that he explained erotic communication, an undoubtedly important and 
one of the most intensive form of togetherness, as the experience of shared overcoming of indi-
vidual discontinuity, indicating that its integrative power is based on senseless harm and violent-
ly overstepping the boundaries. In my opinion, such differences in thinking are not irreconcila-
ble, because in them, various phases of the same process, initial and mature modality of living 
together is observed, i.e. the manner in which a community is initiated, on one hand, and the 
manner in which its successful maintenance is provided, on the other hand. In that sense, I be-
lieve it to be true that building close relationships and starting life together – and not only in the 
erotic aspect, but also in the broader social context – includes the elements of violence and un-
reasonable overstepping the established boundaries, but I am convinced that an even bigger or 
more important truth is that the survival and harmonious functioning of every community rests 
on a dynamic process of mutual understanding, as well as on a necessary regard of reasonable 
restrictions by its members.     
So, a hermeneutic process should not be understood as a straight-line maintenance of ra-
tionality, but as a winding path which contains many stages of unreasonableness, but also in-
cludes the capacity for their subsequent life-saving understanding. Furthermore, hermeneutic ra-
tionality should not be thought of as a technique over which man does not have total control, but 
as a linguistic power which can only partially be controlled through human will, because its 
foundation is divine, so many things relating to it seem inexplicable and surprising. If hereme-
neutics is understood in this way, it is justified to claim that it represents the foundation of every 
human community.   
4. Conclusion 
Hermeneutics cannot be reduced to a mere method of scientific or philosophical 
knowledge, because it is not only a collection of rules for the successful interpretation of texts or 
historic events, but, there is a human way of life at its base, that is, understanding treatment of 
reality. The point is that unlike animals, which just live, i.e. follow their instincts in the condi-
tions of a given environment, a man lives his life, and that means that he lives in a hermeneutic 
manner, by consciously directing his own actions toward the realization of certain goals, in ac-
cordance with his understanding of the world and the order of values. So, hermeneutics primarily 
concerns man’s living his own life, which implies a certain level of rational self-control, but not 
total rationality or control over himself, because man is at the same time also guided by God’s 
will, so he is always in the situation to look for hidden rational meaning in something he does not 
completely control through his interpretations, and which often seems to him irrational or absurd.  
God’s will is manifested through social interaction, through what the other people say 
and do, because it is something that exceeds our individual self-control and self-sufficient man-
ner of living one’s own life, which is why it is justified to assert that communication in a com-
munity is of constitutional significance for hermeneutics. In that sense, in this paper, I have ad-
vocated the thesis of the shared character of a hermeneutic process, that hermeneutic act is never 
an individual interpretation or an individual’s private matter, but living a life and interpreting in 
the spirit of communicative rationality, i.e. in the spirit of cognitive processes which are sensitive 
to other people and God as eminent Other. It is about hermeneutics, unlike explanation processes 
in the so-called strict sciences, including the coactivity of cognitive, emotional and volitional 
processes, their intrapersonal and interpersonal coordination, which affirms dialogical diversity, 
but also enables sensitive and motivational compliance with the God-given order of values. 
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In accordance with the previously stated, I have also defended the thesis of the hermeneu-
tic character of a community in the paper, how sustainable life in every community rests on her-
meneutic-linguistic capacities to overcome past misunderstandings, irrational disintegration and 
conflicts through new and better understanding. It is true that violence in social relations can be 
effective short-term, concerning indisputable initial significance of violently overstepping the 
boundaries for starting shared experiences. However, the most important point concerns the fact 
that the duration of living together is conditioned by the possibility to always repeatedly deal 
with the ambivalent (divine-human and unconscious-conscious) aspects of hermeneutic rationali-
ty through semi-controlled (partially controlled, and partially uncontrolled) language articulation.   
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